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JUDICIAL TAKINGS, JUDICIAL
SPEECH, AND DOCTRINAL
ACCEPTANCE OF THE MODEL OF
THE JUDGE AS POLITICAL ACTOR
WILLIAM P. MARSHALL*

I. INTRODUCTION
For years, academics from a variety of disciplines have set forth a
rich literature asserting that judges’ policy preferences, rather than
adhesion to neutral legal principles, determine legal results in close
1
cases. Much of this writing, referred to here as “Judicial Political
2
Realism,” relies upon empirical studies, which show that a judge’s
* Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. I am deeply indebted to Gregory
Goldman for his research assistance. I would also like to thank Don Hornstein, Joe Kalo, Ernie
Young, Eric Segall, John Orth, Victor Flatt, Richard Myers, Melissa Jacoby, Scott Baker, and
Al Brophy for their helpful ideas and comments.
1. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 7 (2008). See generally JEFFREY A.
SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993)
(applying an attitudinal model to examine the decisions and decision-making processes of the
Supreme Court); James L. Gibson, From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory
in the Study of Judicial Behavior, 5 POL. BEHAV. 7 (1983) (discussing the development of
theories of judicial behavior); Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public
and Academic Debates about Statistical Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 743 (2005) (presenting
empirical accounts of judicial behavior); CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006) (analyzing empirical research
on judicial behavior).
2. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
831, 834–35 (2008). Sunstein and Miles appear to use the term “New Legal Realism” to apply
generally to the entire field of empirical literature that seeks to ascribe the results in judicial
decisions to factors other than the dispassionate application of legal principles and doctrine. In
this paper, I will use the term Judicial Political Realism as referring to the literature that
describes judicial decision-making as based on the personal political preferences of the judges. I
use the term to incorporate both the studies that explain judicial decisions as directly reflecting
the political preferences of the judges (i.e., a judge will vote to vindicate abortion rights if she is
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ideology (usually determined by referencing the political party of the
3
judge’s appointing president ) significantly explains patterns of
4
judicial votes. Some studies take these results and conclude that
law—in terms of legal rules and doctrine—is largely irrelevant. Other
studies assert that law may constrain decision making, but only
partially, and even then a judge’s reliance on law may be better
explained as strategic decision-making that takes into account
5
institutional limitations and possible political backlash in order to
allow the judge to effectuate her policy preferences over the long
6
term rather than in only the immediate case before her. In either
case, the thrust of these studies is to depict judges as political actors
promoting their own policy goals, rather than as dispassionate
decision-makers neutrally reaching results in cases based upon the
dictates of legal rules, doctrine, and reasoning.
Not surprisingly, the practicing bar, judges, and (most) legal
academics generally have not warmly received the Judicial Political
Realist literature. Most lawyers like to believe that legal rules, legal
doctrine, and legal reasoning matter even in close cases. They think
that there are good legal arguments and bad legal arguments and that
the strength of the argument pushes the judge one way or another in
choosing among plausible outcomes. Most judges, in turn, do not like
to view themselves as merely political actors akin to state legislators.
They like to see their actions as guided by high legal principle rather
than by base political preference. Most legal academics, of which I am
one, would prefer not to tell our students that when they argue their
first case in court, they might as well only stand up and say, “Your
Honor, this is a close case and since you are going to do whatever you
want anyway based upon your normative inclinations, I will just sit
down.”
pro-choice) and studies that suggest a judge may pursue a political agenda by strategically
voting against his political preference in a given case in order to effectuate his political agenda
over the long term.
3. The party of the appointing president is only one of a number of measures of ideology
that has been used in this literature and, in fact, what should be the appropriate measure is very
much disputed. See id. at 836 n.23 and cited authorities therein.
4. See id. at 831.
5. See generally Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch
Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. POLS.
1018 (2004) (contending that public opinion, including fears of public backlash, affects judicial
decision-making).
6. See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998)
(contending that judges will sometimes sacrifice short-term policy goals in favor of long-term
results).

DO NOT DELETE

2011]

6/23/2011 4:24:45 PM

JUDICIAL TAKINGS AND THE JUDGE AS A POLITICAL ACTOR

3

The implication that judges are only political actors effectuating
their own policy preferences is enormous. To quote Judge Richard
Posner, “[i]f changing judges changes law, it is not even clear what law
7
is.” Further, if there is no “law” external from the judges’ preferences,
it is not clear why judges (many of whom are not elected) should have
their particular political agendas trump those of other political actors.
Where does a court’s legitimacy come from if not from its role in
upholding the Rule of Law? Furthermore, if legal decisions primarily
rest on a judge’s preexisting preferences, then what is the meaning or
purpose of legal rules, doctrine, or reasoning?
The resistance of the legal profession to the challenges posed by
the Judicial Political Realists is therefore understandable. Even
8
beyond believing that rules of law make a difference, the legal
profession has a vested interest in seeing the role of the judiciary as
one of “call[ing] balls and strikes,” in the words of Chief Justice
9
Roberts, and not as one of advancing its own political agenda with
little internal constraint. It has a similar interest in asserting that rules,
doctrine, and reasoning matter. If not, the enterprise of lawyering is
merely a charade.
Against this background, it is interesting to note two recent
United States Supreme Court cases in which the Court, or at least
some of its Justices, appears to allow the notion that judges are
political actors to infiltrate constitutional doctrine. In the first,
10
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the Court ruled that a state
could not prohibit candidates for judicial office from announcing their
11
views on issues that might come before them. For First Amendment
purposes, judicial candidates are to be treated no differently than
legislative candidates; the voters are entitled to know the candidates’
views on the issues and they are expected to support or oppose a
12
candidate on that basis. The implicit suggestion in White mirrors the
7. POSNER, supra note 1, at 1.
8. See Lawrence B. Solum, Judicial Selection: Ideology Versus Character, 26 CARDOZO L.
REV. 659, 689 (2004) (“[I]deological struggle . . . makes nonideological judging necessary to
realize the rule of law.”); Lawrence B. Solum, The Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian
Guide to Judicial Selection, 61 S. CAL. L. Rev. 1735, 1741–51 (1988) (contending that judges can
decide cases without inserting nonlegal policy considerations into their decision making).
9. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of
the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of
John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee for Chief Justice of U.S. Supreme Court).
10. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
11. Id. at 788.
12. Id. at 781–82.
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judges-as-political-actors critique—judges, like legislators, bring
political agendas to their service.
In the second case, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida
13
Department of Environmental Protection, four Justices, in an opinion
authored by Justice Scalia, argued that the Court should recognize a
doctrine of “judicial takings”—meaning that a change in property
rights resulting from a judicial opinion entitles the aggrieved property
owner to the same sort of compensation that a property owner would
receive if the change to her rights occurred as a result of legislative
14
enactment. To these Justices, there was no constitutional difference
between judicial and legislative action for the purposes of the Takings
15
Clause. Even more graphically than in White, the judicial takings
theory advanced in Stop the Beach Renourishment sets forth the
vision of judges as political actors. Judicial decisions are not to be
treated as interpretations of law but as exercises of raw political
power akin to legislative enactments.
The Court in neither White nor Stop the Beach Renourishment
stopped to address the view of judges as political actors inherent in
their opinions. This paper does so. After first canvassing the specifics
of both the White and Stop the Beach Renourishment opinions, it
discusses what these cases say about the nature of judging and judicial
institutions.
Part II sets forth the necessary background. It discusses the
Judicial Political Realist model of judging and shows how this model
contrasts with the traditional account of legal decision-making, which
sees the judicial obligation as adherence to the Rule of Law. Part III
discusses the White and Stop the Beach Renourishment decisions and
demonstrates how both opinions reflect the Judicial Political Realist

13. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592
(2010).
14. Id. at 2601–02. Justice Scalia advocated in favor of recognizing a judicial takings
doctrine in Parts II and III of his opinion, in which he was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Thomas and Alito. The remaining Justices concurred in the judgment and joined Parts
I, IV, and V of the opinion, but did not believe that the constitutionality of judicial takings
should be decided in the case at bar because there was clearly no taking (and thus the question
of just compensation need not be resolved). See, e.g., id. at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he plurality unnecessarily addresses questions of
constitutional law that are better left for another day.”). Justice Kennedy’s opinion also
expressed serious reservations as to whether a doctrine of judicial takings should ever be
recognized. See id. at 2613 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
15. Id. at 2602 (“If a legislature or a court declares that what was once an established right
of private property no longer exists, it has taken that property . . . .”).
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account. Part IV inquires why the Justices in White and Stop the Beach
Renourishment proceeded as they did. Part V then discusses the
negative implications for judicial institutions inherent in the doctrinal
acceptance of the Judicial Political Realist model. Part VI then offers
a brief conclusion.
Before proceeding, two taxonomical notes are in order. First, the
paper uses the term “Judicial Political Realist” to refer only to those
accounts which suggest that a judge’s political preferences guide legal
16
decisions, whether in the short term (the “attitudinalist” model) or in
17
the long term (the strategic model). In so doing, it omits reference to
critiques suggesting that gender or other such factors are
18
determinative in legal decision-making. Second, unless otherwise
indicated, any reference to Stop the Beach Renourishment refers to
the opinion authored by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito.
Finally, I should reemphasize that I am not asserting that the
Justices signing on to the White or Stop the Beach Renourishment
opinions explicitly or intentionally adopted the Judicial Political
Realist model. Rather, I contend that both cases are substantial
moves towards the incorporation of the model of judges as political
actors into constitutional doctrine and both cases therefore raise the
institutional concerns associated with that account.
II. BACKGROUND
In popular perception, judges decide (or should decide) cases by
strict adherence to the Rule of Law. While not precisely defined, this
proposition appears to be divided into two subcomponents. The first is
that judges have a duty to decide cases according to external, neutral
principles. The second is that judges should not allow personal beliefs
or philosophy to influence their decisions.
16. See sources cited supra note 2.
17. See, e.g., McGuire & Stimson, supra note 5; EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 6; Frank B.
Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95
NW. U. L. REV. 1437 (2001) (discussing the institutional context of judicial behavior); WALTER
F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964) (discussing judicial power to shape
public policy).
18. See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal
Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389 (2010) (dissecting the effects of gender on
judicial decision-making); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for
the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65
OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (2004) (concluding that judges’ religious beliefs can affect judicial decisionmaking).
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The belief that judges have a duty to decide cases in accordance
with the Rule of Law is deeply ingrained in our political culture and
has considerable political resonance. Critics of controversial judicial
decisions, for example, strive to delegitimize the opinions with which
they disagree by attacking the deciding judge or judges as acting
outside the Rule of Law—sometimes characterizing the judge or
19
judges’ actions as “legislating from the bench” or suggesting that the
20
judge or judges engaged in “judicial activism.” These attacks,
moreover, are not limited to condemning decided cases, but are also
used in political discourse to generate resistance to an opposing
21
party’s judicial nominees. Thus, both Republicans and Democrats
commonly criticize each other as insufficiently committed to the Rule
of Law and as having the intent to nominate judicial “activists” who
22
will only further the party’s political agenda. This Rule of Law
rhetoric continues throughout the nominations process as virtually
every nominee to the federal bench solemnly declares that she will
never let her personal views influence her judicial decision-making,
knowing full well that if she were to say something different her
23
nomination would self-destruct.
19. Viet D. Dinh, Threats to Judicial Independence, Real and Imagined, 95 GEO. L.J. 929,
940 (2007).
20. Id. at 938.
21. See Solum, Judicial Selection: Ideology Versus Character, supra note 8, at 664 (quoting
Senator Charles Schumer’s New York Times essay regarding opposition to judicial nominees on
ideological grounds); Dinh, supra note 19, at 935–37 (discussing political criticisms of the
judiciary).
22. For example, in response to the Supreme Court seat vacated by Justice Souter,
Republican Senator Orrin Hatch, the ranking Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee,
spoke to President Obama, urging him “not to nominate a ‘judicial activist’” and to “‘choose a
nominee who . . . would uphold the rule of law.’” Alexander Mooney, Hatch to Obama: No
Judicial Activist, CNN.COM POLITICAL TICKER (May 4, 2009, 9:01 PM), http://politicalticker.blo
gs.cnn.com/2009/05/04/hatch-to-obama-no-judicial-activist. Along similar lines, the nomination
of Justice Alito caused a stir among Democrats who saw Alito as an advocate of the far-right
wing of American politics. Peter Baker, Alito Nomination Sets Stage for Ideological Battle:
Bush’s Court Pick is Appeals Judge With Record of Conservative Rulings, WASH. POST, Nov. 1,
2005, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/10/31/AR2
005103100180.html.
23. The most recent high-profile nominee to adopt this stance during her confirmation
hearings was Justice Elena Kagan. Elena Kagan, N.Y. TIMES (updated Oct. 4, 2010), http://topic
s.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/k/kagan_elena/index.html?scp=1&sq=kagan%2
0confirmation%20hearings&st=cse. Ironically, in a 1995 article, then-Professor Kagan
advocated for a more rigorous confirmation process for judicial nominees by calling for a
“meaningful discussion of legal issues,” and criticizing the confirmation hearings of Justices
Breyer and Ginsburg as “official lovefests.” Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 920 (1995) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS:
CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1995)). See William P. Marshall,
Constitutional Law as Political Spoils, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 525, 534 n.45 (2005) (providing
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The popular perception that judges are bound by an externally
imposed rule of law also has a long-standing counterpart in legal
24
theory. It is called Legal Formalism and for much of our history it
25
dominated the legal theory debate. To Formalists, law is
deterministic, meaning that there are “right” legal decisions dictated
by a correct application of the relevant legal principles. Judges may
make mistakes in deciding cases, but Formalism suggests that judges
correctly applying the appropriate rules to a given case should reach
the same legal result.
Interestingly, however, although popular culture continues to
subscribe to the notion of the inviolability of the Rule of Law,
Formalism has been under siege by legal theorists in the United
26
States since at least the 1870s. Today, as Professor Frederick Schauer
notes, there are probably very few legal theorists, if any, who continue
27
to accept the Formalist claim in its original form.
The reason for Formalism’s demise was a devastating attack
brought on by the so-called Legal Realist School. Led by such
28
29
scholars as Jerome Frank and Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realists argued
that law was not externally based, but rather derived from the
institutions empowered to decide cases. To the Realists, law was
indeterminate and judges’ decisions depended as much on context as
30
upon strict application of rules of law. Justice Holmes’s statement

other examples of Supreme Court nominees declining to address political views during
confirmation hearings).
24. FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 29–35 (2009) [hereinafter
SCHAUER]; See generally Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988) (discussing
legal formalism). The notion that judges are constrained by an externally imposed rule of law
has also been referred to as “legalism.” POSNER, supra note 1, at 41.
25. Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731, 731 (2009)
(“‘Until the twentieth century, most lawyers and scholars believed that judging was a
mechanistic enterprise in which judges applied the law and rendered decisions without recourse
to their own ideological or policy preferences . . . .’” (quoting VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER,
STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK, JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT 30
(2006))).
26. At least one scholar suggests that the rejection of Formalism may have begun
contemporaneously with its rise. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST
DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 29–33 (2010).
27. See SCHAUER, supra note 24, at 125.
28. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) (setting forth the Realist
account of judicial decision-making).
29. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1930)
(setting forth the Realist account of judicial decision-making); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism
About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931) (same).
30. SCHAUER, supra note 24, at 128.
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that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience”
is probably the most famous summary of this position.
Notably, the Legal Realist position challenged only the notion that
law was externally derived. The Realists did not speak to the question
of whether law was “political” in the policy-pursuing sense of the
term, nor did they address whether law was merely a function of the
32
political positions of the judges who decide cases. Those concepts
had yet to be crystallized. Their focus was instead on the development
of law as a whole and not the individual preferences of sitting judges.
The idea that law is essentially political was far more central to
33
the work of the Critical Legal Studies movement. But like the Legal
Realists, the Critical Legal Theorist account was systemic rather than
individualistic. They saw law as a manifestation of the political
34
dominance of entrenched power structures, meaning that the law,
taken as a whole, should be understood as favoring the interests of
already politically dominant groups over the rights of the
35
disenfranchised and marginalized. Like the Legal Realists before
them, the Critical Legal Theorists did not address whether law was
36
merely the political preferences of the deciding judges. That next
step was to be the mission of the Judicial Political Realists.
Interestingly, the Judicial Political Realist account began in
earnest outside the realm of legal theory, in the province of political
science. Judicial Political Realism, moreover, unlike Legal Realism
and Critical Legal Studies, based its critique upon empirical study and
not on theory. Specifically, the political scientist Harold Spaeth
tracked judicial votes in ideologically laden cases and, measuring
those results against the perceived ideology of the judge, found
empirical support for the proposition that judges decide cases in
accord with their ideological values rather than by the application of
37
legal rules and doctrine. He referred to this method of judicial
31. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
32. See Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What is the Issue?, 16 LEGAL
THEORY 111, 119 (2010) (“But it was not the thesis of the Realists that judges decided in
accordance ‘with their political views’!”(citation omitted)).
33. See id. at 118 n.36 (discussing the Critical Legal Studies movement); John Hasnas, Back
to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal Realism, or How Not to Miss the
Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45 DUKE L.J. 84, 97 (1995).
34. SCHAUER, supra note 24, at 146; Hasnas, supra note 33, at 97.
35. See Hasnas, supra note 33, at 97 (stating that judges’ preservation of social hierarchies
is veiled by the Rule of Law concept).
36. Leiter, supra note 32, at 188 n.36.
37. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 65.
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38

decision-making as “attitudinalist.” Later writers have since added to
(or modified) Spaeth’s attitudinal model by demonstrating that a
judge’s willingness to vote in accord with her ideological
predispositions may be affected by institutional incentives, and that a
judge may strategically vote in a particular case in order to achieve
39
ideological vindication over the long term. Nonetheless, Spaeth’s
overall premise, that judges decide cases based on preexisting
preferences, rather than by objective applications of legal doctrine,
40
remains essentially in place.
The empirical accounts of Spaeth and others, studying how judges
actually behave, were for many years largely ignored by the legal
community. As Judge Posner wrote, “[t]hese theories are expounded
in a rich literature ignored by most academic lawyers . . . and by
41
virtually all judges.”
More recently, however, legal academics have begun to take
42
notice. Further, the Judicial Political Realist model has received
reinforcement from another source as well—the United States Senate,
or at least some United States Senators opposing a particular
President’s judicial nominee. Asserting that a judge’s preexisting
philosophies can influence her decision making, these Senators have
begun inquiring into judicial philosophy in confirmation hearings
even as the nominees’ stock answer—that they will not let their
personal beliefs affect their judicial decision-making—remains exactly
43
the same.
38. Id.
39. See generally McGuire & Stimson, supra note 5; EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 6;
Cross & Nelson, supra note 17; MURPHY, supra note 17.
40. Perhaps even more empirically established than Spaeth’s view—that judges are
primarily motivated by their preexisting ideology when deciding cases—is the assertion that,
when deciding cases, judges are motivated by factors other than legal doctrine. See Theodore W.
Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to
Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1155 (showing by an
empirical study of the Supreme Court’s 2002 Term that a forecasting machine that is
“indifferent to specific doctrine and text” can predict the results in Supreme Court cases better
than doctrinal experts).
41. POSNER, supra note 1, at 7.
42. See generally, Eric A. Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications
of Judicial Bias Studies for Legal and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853, 856 (2008)
(discussing the implication of empirical scholarship for doctrinal analysis); Frank B. Cross,
Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance,
92 NW. U. L. REV. 251 (1997) (discussing the relationship between traditional legal scholarship
and empirical studies of judicial behavior).
43. See, e.g., Charles E. Schumer, Op-Ed., Judging By Ideology, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2001,
at A19, available at http://schumer.senate.gov/about_chuck/op-ed_ideology.html (arguing for a
“return to a more open and rational debate about ideology when [senators] consider
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Law itself has remained largely unaffected by the Judicial Political
44
Realist attack. Lawyers argue cases as if doctrine matters and judges
decide cases by citing text, precedent, and history and never intimate
that personal ideology rather than legal principle guides their
decision. Legal academics—other than those specifically examining
judicial behavior—continue to analyze law in its own terms and not
relative to the judges deciding the cases. The criticism that a judge has
inserted her political beliefs into a judicial decision, rather than
adhering to the Rule of Law, still resonates as a powerful
condemnation of that judge’s actions. It is neither intended, nor taken,
as accepting the proposition that an expected part of the judicial
45
function is that a judge will insert her political preferences into law.
Part IV, below, discusses why this may be so. For the moment,
however, it is worth discussing two Supreme Court cases, Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White and Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v.
Florida Department of Environmental Protection, in which the
account of judges as political actors appears to have made inroads
into judicial doctrine.
III. DOCTRINAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE MODEL OF THE JUDGE AS
POLITICAL ACTOR
A. Judicial Speech and Republican Party of Minnesota v. White
46

In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Gregory Wersal, a
candidate for the position of Associate Justice of the Minnesota
Supreme Court, challenged the constitutionality of a Minnesota
Canon of Judicial Conduct providing that a candidate for judicial
office could not “announce his or her views on disputed legal or
47
political issues.” Under this Canon, for example, a candidate could
not declare her views on such matters as abortion, capital punishment,
criminal sentencing, or tort reform without incurring the risk of
nominees”).
44. To be sure, there have been some doctrines adopted by courts that are designed to
lessen the chances that judges’ policy preferences might affect their decisions. See Chevron,
U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), discussed infra notes 102–06 and accompanying text.
45. Notably, even leading empirical scholars such as Mitu Gulati and Stephen Choi
evaluate a judge’s independence from others in her political party as an attribute of judicial
excellence. Mitu Gulati & Stephen Choi, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An
Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004).
46. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
47. MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, CANON 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000).
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ethical sanction. Claiming that this provision prevented him from
campaigning on, or even mentioning, his views on controversial issues,
Wersal alleged that Minnesota’s judicial canon violated his rights
48
under the First Amendment.
In a 5–4 decision, the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion
49
written by Justice Scalia, agreed with the plaintiff. The Court first
held that because speech relating to a candidate’s qualification lies at
50
the core of the First Amendment, the Minnesota Canon could be
upheld only if it was “narrowly tailored, to serve a compelling
51
governmental interest.” After then finding that the state’s asserted
interests of promoting judicial impartiality and the appearance of
judicial impartiality were not sufficiently compelling, the Court ruled
52
that the provision was unconstitutional.
The Court’s decision in White was not unexpected. The Court was
exactly on point in noting the critical importance of freedom of
speech to political campaigns for elected office. Indeed, to some First
Amendment theorists, the raison d’être for protecting freedom of
53
speech is its role in fostering self-government. There is no speech
more directed at this purpose than speech designed to help voters
make informed decisions. Furthermore, in White itself there was no
doubt that the judicial canon in question severely restricted the ability
of judicial candidates to reach out to their constituencies.
What is more significant about White for our purposes, though, are
the justifications about the nature of judicial decision-making that the
Court offered in defense of its holding. The State argued that the
Canon promoted judicial impartiality because a candidate who had
not taken a position on a controversial issue would be more open to
48. The Minnesota Republican Party and others parties joined Wersal as plaintiffs in the
case, contending that their First Amendment rights were violated because the Canon’s
restrictions meant they were denied sufficient information from which they could determine
whether to support Wersal’s candidacy. White, 536 U.S. at 770.
49. Id. at 788.
50. Id. at 774; see also Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271–72 (1971) (“And if it
be conceded that the First Amendment was ‘fashioned to assure the unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people,’ then it can
hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application
precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.”).
51. White, 536 U.S. at 775.
52. Id. at 776.
53. The self-governance rationale is most closely associated with the writings of Alexander
Meiklejohn. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT, 15–16, 24–27, 39 (1948). See also Harry Kalvin, The New York Times Case: A
note on the Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1960).
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ruling on either side of that issue should it come before her as judge.
A candidate who had taken a position on an issue, in contrast, would
be more likely to rule on the side of the issue on which they had
campaigned. The Court, however, viewed the type of impartiality that
the state could permissibly promote far more narrowly, seeing it only
54
as a “lack of bias for or against either party to the proceeding.” To
the Court, an impartial judge was not one without predispositions to
vote in certain ways on certain issues; rather, it meant only that the
judge was not biased against a particular party in a particular
55
proceeding. Thus, a judge who as a candidate may have expressed
her views on how an issue should be decided would still be considered
impartial. As the Court stated:
[W]hen a case arises that turns on a legal issue on which the judge
(as a candidate) had taken a particular stand, the party taking the
opposite stand is likely to lose. But not because of any bias against
that party, or favoritism toward the other party. Any party taking
that position is just as likely to lose. The judge is applying the law
56
(as he sees it) evenhandedly.

Notably, the foregoing passage is by itself significant in setting the
stage of a Judicial Political Realist account of judicial decisionmaking. It explicitly rests on the proposition that a judge is likely to
bring preexisting views to her legal decisions. But the Court did not
stop there. To the White Court, eliminating a judge’s preconceptions is
unattainable:
For one thing, it is virtually impossible to find a judge who does
not have preconceptions about the law. As then-Justice Rehnquist
observed of our own Court: “Since most Justices come to this
bench no earlier than their middle years, it would be unusual if
they had not by that time formulated at least some tentative
notions that would influence them in their interpretation of the
sweeping clauses of the Constitution and their interaction with one
another. It would be not merely unusual, but extraordinary, if they
had not at least given opinions as to constitutional issues in their
57
previous legal careers.”

54. White, 536 U.S. at 775.
55. Id. at 776.
56. Id. (emphasis omitted).
57. Id. at 777–78 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (memorandum
opinion)). Indeed, the Court went on to suggest that finding a judge without preexisting views
would not even be desirable. Again citing Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court stated: “Proof that
a Justice's mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of

DO NOT DELETE

2011]

6/23/2011 4:24:45 PM

JUDICIAL TAKINGS AND THE JUDGE AS A POLITICAL ACTOR

13

To be sure, White need not be read as embracing a Judicial
Political Realist account. It could be viewed as standing only for the
more modest proposition that judicial candidates have preexisting
opinions on legal issues and that the interests of an informed
electorate should allow a judicial candidate to communicate those
views to her constituency. White, however, is not so easily constrained.
After all, White also struck down Minnesota’s provision prohibiting
58
judicial candidates from announcing their political views. By holding
that judicial candidates can campaign for votes on the basis of their
political positions, the opinion suggests that judicial decisions, like
legislative decisions, are appropriately products of political choice. In
that sense, White normalizes the view that judicial decisions may be
based on political preference and not rules of law. A decision on the
constitutionality of gun control, for example, is determined not on the
basis of what the Constitution means, but on whether a state’s
electorate has elected pro-gun or pro-gun control jurists.
Of course, White’s apparent acceptance of the Judicial Political
Realist account might be defended on grounds that the insertion of
politics in judicial decision-making necessarily follows from any legal
system that elects judges. Under this view, White should not be
extrapolated to apply to the Court’s view on the enterprise of judicial
decision-making generally. It only applies to decision making by
elected judges. Perhaps. But the fact that a state elects its judges does
not mean that it has endorsed, or even acquiesced in, the view that
rules of law should be politically determined. The states that utilize
elections as their method of judicial selection did not adopt that
system for this reason. Rather, the primary reasons animating the
59
broad movement by the states to a system of judicial elections were

constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias.” Id.
(quoting Laird, 409 U.S. at 835).
58. MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, CANON 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000). The Court’s
decision protecting the right of judicial candidates to campaign on their political views also
suggests that the Court believes those views are relevant to how judges decide cases. Why, after
all, would an informed electorate need to know if a judge was pro-life or pro-choice if those
political dispositions were irrelevant to the judge’s decision making?
59. The key time period in which this movement took place was 1846–1860. See
Christopher Rapp, Note, The Will of the People, the Independence of the Judiciary, and Free
Speech in Judicial Elections after Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 21 J.L. & POL. 103,
107 (2005). Mississippi actually predated this trend and became the first state to call for the
election of all state judges in 1832. Vermont, Georgia, and Indiana, meanwhile, elected trialcourt judges at the local level in the early 1800s. See MATTHEW J. STREB, RUNNING FOR JUDGE:
THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 9 (2007).
Electing judges was also not unknown at the time of the ratification of the Constitution.
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general notions of Jacksonian democracy and concerns for protecting
60
the independence of judges. The purpose of these measures was not
61
to allow voters to pick and choose the meaning of legal rules.
Moreover, the states have continued to reject the notion that judicial
elections should be seen as vehicles for placing rules of law up for
political referenda. That is why Minnesota’s judicial canon (and those
of other states) prohibited judges from campaigning on their political
views. The notion, in short, that political preferences should determine
legal rules of decision does not inevitably flow from the nature of
judicial elections. It does, however, flow directly from White.
B. Judicial Takings and Stop the Beach Renourishment
The recognition of the doctrine of “judicial takings” in Justice
Scalia’s opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment is, in many ways,
even more significant jurisprudentially in its acceptance of the
Judicial Political Realist model than is the Court’s opinion in White.
White used the Judicial Political Realist model only as part of its
justification for rejecting the State’s argument in favor of curbing a
judicial candidate’s speech rights. The implicit message in Justice
Scalia’s recognition of judicial takings in Stop the Beach
Vermont’s 1777 Constitution, in force until Vermont became a state in 1791, called for the
popular election of some lower-court judges. VT. CONST. of 1777 § 27.
60. See Rapp, supra note 59, at 9 (attributing the states’ move to judicial elections as part of
the wave of Jacksonian democracy). As Streb writes, “the rise of Jacksonian democracy gave
more power to the people and raised questions about the accountability of judges. Not electing
state judges was considered to be undemocratic, and the Jacksonian era was dominated by
beliefs in expanded suffrage and popular control of elected officials.” Id.
Other scholars suggest that the reasons underlying the states’ adoption of judicial elections
were more complex. See Caleb Nelson, Note, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the
Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190, 190–92 (1993).
That is, the delegates from various states not only discussed the desirability of judicial elections
in terms of democratic populism or judicial independence, but also raised a number of other
issues. To Nelson, “the arguments on both sides were sophisticated . . . . Most delegates clearly
had more in mind than merely applying the democratic principle.” Id. at 192. Nelson asserts that
the real underlying force that led to judicial elections was an overall suspicion of government.
Nelson, supra, at 203. He writes:
The rise of the elective judiciary marked not a mere transfer of power from one branch of
government to another, but an effort to decrease official power as a whole. It arose from the
people's profound distrust of their own government, whose officials could not be counted upon
to act in the citizenry's best interests. Id.
61. To be sure, as Kermit Hall explains, there were some who supported judicial elections
who were concerned with judicial activism and who believed that elections could help curb
judicial overreaching. See Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform
and the Rise of an Elected Judiciary, 1846–1860, 45 HISTORIAN 337, 348 (1983). But, as Hall
maintains, the primary support for judicial elections was to preserve judicial independence and
not to undercut it. Id at 342–43.
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Renourishment, however, goes much further and suggests that
substantive rules of constitutional law need to be refashioned in light
of the Judicial Political Realist account. Before we get to this point,
however, it is necessary to provide some background to the
underlying takings issue.
1. The Takings Clause
The Takings Clause provides that no “private property [shall] be
62
taken for public use, without just compensation.” As its text
indicates, the Takings Clause does not prohibit the government’s
seizure of property for public use, but only requires the government
63
to provide compensation in the event that it does so. Its underlying
rationale, as the Court has explained, is not to prevent the
government from acting in the public interest, but to assure that the
government does not force “some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
64
public as a whole.” Significantly, although the Takings Clause is most
65
commonly associated with eminent-domain proceedings —where the
government seizes an owner’s property, permanently or temporarily,
66
for public purpose —a takings claim, known as a “regulatory taking,”
can arise when a government’s regulatory action is “so onerous that
67
its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster.”
2. Judicial Takings
The theory of “judicial takings” is that the protections of the
Takings Clause should also apply to the decisions of the judicial
branch. Under such a doctrine, property owners whose rights are
62. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
63. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 314 (1987).
64. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also Monongahela Navigation
Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893) (“[The Takings Clause] prevents the public from
loading upon one individual more than his just share of the burdens of government.”).
65. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2601 (2010) (“[T]he classic taking is a transfer of property to the State or another private party
by eminent domain . . . .”).
66. See generally, e.g., United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951) (holding that
the government’s seizure and operation of a coal mine to prevent a national strike of coal
miners constituted a taking).
67. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 528 (2005). As the Lingle Court noted, the
test for when regulatory takings should be recognized, first set forth by Justice Holmes in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), is rather enigmatic: “‘[W]hile property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.’”
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548 (quoting Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415).
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sufficiently adversely affected by a judicial decision are entitled to
compensation just as much as property owners whose rights are
adversely affected by an executive or legislative branch decision. As
Professor Barton Thompson explains, the theory of judicial takings
rests in exactly this symmetry, and he offers the following example in
support:
Under the traditional common law rule, owners of beachfront
property hold title down to the mean high tide line. If the
executive or legislative branch of a state government were to order
private beachfront owners to permit the public onto the portion of
their beaches between the mean high tide line and the vegetation
line, without compensation, the United States Supreme Court
would almost certainly hold that the state had taken the
beachowners’ property in violation of the Constitution. If, on the
other hand, a state court were to reject the traditional common law
rule, overrule its prior decisions, and hold that private owners
exercise dominion only to the vegetation line, this might not be
considered an unconstitutional taking. The immediate
consequence to the beachowners, however, is identical: in both
cases, they have lost the exclusive right to a portion of what they
68
justifiably had thought was their beach.

Although some courts have recognized the principle of judicial
69
takings, the United States Supreme Court has never formally
70
accepted the doctrine. Indeed, a few of its decisions indicate that
71
Takings Clause protections do not apply to judicial decisions. That
issue, however, was placed squarely before the Court this past term in
72
Stop the Beach Renourishment.

68. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1450 (1990).
69. See, e.g., Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473, 482–83 (D. Haw. 1978)
(holding that the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision violated the Fifth Amendment’s takings
protections); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Haw. 1975) (finding that a Hawaii
Supreme Court decision that converted private water rights to public water rights was a taking).
70. The roots of the doctrine in the United States Supreme Court can be traced, however,
to Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1967)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“Of course the [Washington Supreme Court] did not conceive of this
action as a taking. . . . But the Constitution measures a taking of property not by what a State
says, or by what it intends, but by what it does.”).
71. See, e.g., Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364–66 (1932);
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680–81 (1930). For an excellent,
thorough analysis and chronology of the judicial takings concept, see Thompson, supra note 68,
at 1463–72.
72. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2597
(2010) (“We consider a claim that the decision of a State's court of last resort took property
without just compensation in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”).
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3. Stop the Beach Renourishment
Stop the Beach Renourishment presented the Court with a judicial
takings claim by a group of beachfront property owners in an area of
Florida that had suffered serious beach erosion. In response to this
erosion, the owners’ communities sought to engage in a beach
restoration project that would fill in land by inserting sand deposits
between the edge of owners’ property and the water. By Florida
statute, the beach created as a result of the new sand deposits would
73
belong to the state, meaning that the property owners’ land would
74
no longer touch the water even though they would not lose any
actual acreage. Further, the owners would also not have the right to
take ownership through the common-law property right of accretion
to land created by any natural expansion of the beach, a right they
75
would have enjoyed had their property continued to abut the water.
Contending that this loss of land touching the water and the loss
76
of their rights of accretion constituted a taking, the owners
challenged the project in the Florida state courts. The case eventually
reached the Florida State Supreme Court, which ultimately rejected
the owners’ claims, holding that Florida property law did not protect
77
the owners’ asserted property interests. The property owners then
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, asserting that the
decision of the Florida Supreme Court changed preexisting Florida
78
law and was therefore itself a taking.
79
The United State Supreme Court in an 8–0 decision found for
the State with all the participating Justices agreeing that the Florida
Supreme Court decision did not violate the owners’ constitutional
rights. The Justices differed, however, as to whether the Court should
73. Id. at 2599.
74. Florida law did provide that the landowners would continue to have the right of access
to the water over the state-owned lands. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2600. Because no land of the property owners was actually seized under the
project, the owners’ claim in Stop the Beach Renourishment was in the nature of a regulatory
taking. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding that “while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking”).
77. See Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1105 (Fla.
2008).
78. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2600–01. As noted in the Court’s
opinion, although the Supreme Court of Florida did not address the question that was presented
in the petition for writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court granted certiorari because the decision
of the state court itself was challenged as violating federal law. Id. at 2600 n.4.
79. Justice Stevens did not participate in the decision.
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recognize a judicial takings doctrine. Justice Breyer, writing for
himself and Justice Ginsberg, contended that the Court should not
reach the question in Stop the Beach Renourishment because the facts
80
so clearly indicated that no taking of any kind had occurred. Thus,
they concluded that it would be better to preserve the recognition
81
issue for a later date. Justice Kennedy, writing for himself and Justice
Sotomayor, agreed that the Court should not reach the issue under
the facts before them, but Justice Kennedy’s opinion also expressed
serious reservations about whether the Court should ever recognize
82
the doctrine. In Justice Kennedy’s view, the remedy for any judicial
decision that improperly invaded the property owners’ rights should
83
be found in the Due Process Clause and not the Takings Clause.
The critical opinion for our purposes, however, was authored by
Justice Scalia. Although holding that the property owners were unable
to demonstrate that there was a judicial taking under the facts in Stop
84
the Beach Renourishment itself, Justice Scalia’s opinion, joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, asserted that a
85
judicial takings doctrine should be recognized. To Justice Scalia, “[i]t
would be absurd to allow a State to do by judicial decree what the
86
Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat.”
80. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2619 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
81. Id.
82. See id. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(explaining that a judicial takings doctrine would effectively sanction the right of courts to take
property from state residents without holding these courts to the same fiscal and political
constraints applicable to regulatory agencies).
83. See id. at 2614–15 (“If a judicial decision, as opposed to an act of the executive or the
legislature, eliminates an established property right, the judgment could be set aside as a
deprivation of property without due process of law.”).
84. See id. at 2613. According to Justice Scalia, a judicial takings claimant, in order to
successfully maintain a judicial takings claim, must show that the challenged judicial decision
amounted to an “elimination of an established property right.” Id. at 2608. Justice Scalia ruled,
however, that the property owners in Stop the Beach Renourishment were unable to meet this
standard because Florida property law was not sufficiently settled in their favor. See Id. at 2610–
13.
85. See id. at 2601 (“Our precedents provide no support for the proposition that takings
effected by the judicial branch are entitled to special treatment, and in fact suggest the
contrary.”).
86. Id. Justice Scalia also defended recognition of the doctrine on textual grounds.
Specifically, he argued that the text of the Takings Clause, unlike other constitutional provisions
such as the Ex Post Facto Clauses, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 and U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 1,
does not mention a specific branch of government. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at
2601. Justice Scalia asserts, “[t]here is no textual justification for saying that the existence or the
scope of a State's power to expropriate private property without just compensation varies
according to the branch of government effecting the expropriation.” Id.
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Justice Scalia’s opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment marks a
stark example of Judicial Political Realism in action. To begin with,
Justice Scalia’s express equation of a taking by judicial decree and a
taking by legislative fiat is a direct endorsement of the notion that
judicial decision-making is indistinguishable from legislative action.
To Justice Scalia, a judicial decision that upsets an owner’s settled
property interests is a political one, not a legal one. His rhetorical
87
move of ascribing both judicial and legislative action to the “State”
only reinforces this proposition. Justice Scalia’s diminishment of the
role of law in the Florida Supreme Court’s decision could not be
clearer.
The significance of equating legislative takings with judicial
decisions affecting property rights is even more remarkable given the
88
classically legislative nature of a takings action. As discussed above, a
legislative taking occurs when the government appropriates property
for public purpose. In such circumstances, the Takings Clause protects
the property owner by requiring the government to pay for the
appropriation. A government deciding whether to “take” property for
a public purpose is then faced with the policy calculus of determining
whether the benefit of the proposed action is worth the cost of its
89
funding, both in relation to the value of the project itself and in
relation to the other funding priorities facing the government at that
particular moment. This type of calculus, as the Court noted in a
Actually, there may be such a reason. As Justice Scalia later acknowledges in his Stop the
Beach Renourishment opinion, the Framers likely did not believe that courts had the power to
“change” common law. Id. at 2606 (“[T]he Constitution was adopted in an era when courts had
no power to ‘change’ the common law.” (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69–
70 (1765); Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 472–78 (Scalia, J., dissenting))). But if the Framers
did not believe that courts could change law, as Justice Scalia argues, there would have been no
reason for them to include the courts in the anti-takings provision. If, after all, the courts cannot
change the law, they cannot not effectuate a judicial taking, which, by definition, requires a
change in the law. Justice Scalia does not deny this point, rather his response is only a textualist
argument that when constitutional text is clear, the interpretive question “is not what [the
Framers] envisioned but what they wrote.” Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2606. Of
course, even in his textualist assertion, Justice Scalia is not on solid ground, as the Taking
Clause does not mention the courts.
87. Id.
88. See Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution and Property: Due Process, Regulatory
Takings, and Judicial Takings, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 379, 433–34 (2001). As Walston argues, the
ability to effectuate a taking derives from the exercise of the police power, a power enumerated
to the legislative branch (and importantly, not to the judiciary). A taking “involves an inherently
legislative function, not a judicial one.” Id.
89. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2613–14 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that some states allow their officials to reconsider
whether to effectuate a taking after a jury verdict sets the amount of compensation).
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previous case, is inherently legislative.
A court weighing property rights, in contrast, would neither
inquire about, nor have the necessary information to evaluate, the
political wisdom of a forced purchase or how that cost should relate
to other funding priorities. A court presumably would ask an entirely
different set of questions: Does preexisting precedent support the
property claim? Is the claim based on common-law principles? What
are the potential precedential effects in recognizing (or not
recognizing) a property right in this instance? Will the types of policy
considerations that have traditionally justified doctrinal changes in
the law support this decision (if the decision does indeed depart from
existing precedent)? Justice Scalia’s depiction of the judicial decision
as legislative, however, suggests that even if a court reached a
conclusion on the allocation of property rights based upon these sorts
of legal considerations, its judgment should still be considered a
political, and not a legal, decision.
Finally, depicting a judicial property rights decision as a taking
furthers the Judicial Political Realist notion that judges are political
actors in yet another way. Certainly, a court in any given case can
decide an issue in a manner that improperly undercuts the settled
rights of property owners. If it did so, however, one would expect the
decision to be criticized as “wrong” as a matter of law. But this is
where characterizing the court’s action as a taking becomes so
significant. Because takings jurisprudence presumes that the state has
the legitimate power to take private property for public purpose
(subject to a compensation requirement), a judicial takings theory
must also presume that a court has the legitimate power to take
91
private property (subject to compensation). This means even the
most egregious decision by a court invading private property rights
for public use can never initially be criticized as “wrong” or even
92
unconstitutional; it can only be described as requiring compensation.
90. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (“[T]he power of eminent domain is a legislative function.”). As
Roderick Walston notes, also indicating that the takings power is not judicial is the fact that it
stems from the police power, a power a court does not have. See Walston, supra note 88, at 433–
34 (“The courts, unlike legislatures, do not exercise the police power; rather, they exercise solely
an interpretive function.”).
91. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
92. For this reason, Justice Kennedy’s argument—that judicial decisions improperly
affecting property rights should be analyzed under the Due Process Clause—makes far better
sense. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. See also Walston, supra note 88, at 433–38
(arguing that because judicial decisions are a result of different institutional functions than are
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It becomes unconstitutional only if the required compensation is not
93
forthcoming. Justice Scalia’s equation of judicial decrees to
legislative fiats thus suggests that there are no legal bounds to a
judicial decision, there is only political calculus—a conclusion that
could come straight from the Judicial Political Realist account.
IV. WHITE, STOP THE BEACH RENOURISHMENT, AND THE EFFORT
TO CONSTRAIN JUDICIAL POWER
White and Stop the Beach Renourishment did not have to be
reasoned as they were. Even if the Justices joining those decisions
believed that Minnesota’s judicial canon was unconstitutional or that
property owners needed to be constitutionally protected from judicial
decisions that upset settled expectations, there were other options. In
White, for example, the Court’s opinion itself offered an alternative
justification for striking down the challenged provision—specifically
that the provision was “woefully underinclusive” in accomplishing the
state’s purposes because it affected only what a candidate could say
after declaring to run and not what she may have stated up until she
94
announced her candidacy. The opinion did not need to assert that all
judges have preconceived views that necessarily affect judicial
95
decision-making in order to reach its result.
Similarly, in Stop the Beach Renourishment, those supporting the
view that property owners need to be protected from errant judicial
decisions could have relied on Justice Kennedy’s view that any
improper judicial invasion of settled property rights could be

legislative decisions, they should be seen as bound by the Due Process Clause and not the
Takings Clause).
93. A taking that is not for public use, of course, could be ruled unconstitutional on that
ground. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 467, 477 (2005); Haw. Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229, 245 (1984).
94. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 779–80 (2002) (“The short of the
matter is this: In Minnesota, a candidate for judicial office may not say ‘I think it is
constitutional for the legislature to prohibit same-sex marriages.’ He may say the very same
thing, however, up until the very day before he declares himself a candidate, and may say it
repeatedly (until litigation is pending) after he is elected. As a means of pursuing the objective
of open-mindedness that respondents now articulate, the announce clause is so woefully
underinclusive as to render belief in that purpose a challenge to the credulous.”).
95. Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion also provided another possible ground for
decision; i.e., that it was the problem of electing judges, and not what judicial candidates might
say on the campaign trail, that created the actual risk of judicial bias and therefore any bias
issues rested with Minnesota’s method of judicial selection and not its ethical canons. Id. at 788–
92 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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overturned under a due process challenge —a view far more
consistent with the proposition that courts are bound by legal rules
than is Justice Scalia’s judicial takings characterization of court
decisions as akin to legislative actions. Why, then, did the White and
Stop the Beach Renourishment opinions proceed as they did and
seemingly adopt the view of the judge as political actor?
To be sure, it could be argued that the Supreme Court’s doctrinal
recognition of the proposition that law is not derived from external,
objective sources is nothing new. In 1938, in one of its most notable
97
cases, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, the Court decided that the
federal courts had to look to state common law rather than federal
common law in deciding non-statutory claims. Prior to Erie, the
federal courts had relied on their own interpretations of the “general”
common law in deciding such cases based on the premise that,
regardless of forum, the common law derived from a universal
98
source. The Erie Court ruled, however, that because law could no
longer be considered to be derived from a “transcendental body of
99
law outside of any particular state,” displacing state common law
with federal common law offended principles of federalism and
exceeded the federal courts’ power.
But while Erie might (and should) be considered a Legal Realist
decision, it was not a Judicial Political Realist decision in the sense of
suggesting that state and federal judges were acting to further their
own political preferences. Erie suggested that both statutory and
common law were positivistic—that is, that law did not derive from
external sources. Erie said nothing about the reasons why a court
might decide as it did and did not question the motivations or
100
dispassion of the rendering court. The implication in Stop the Beach
96. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2614–15 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (“The Court would be on strong footing in ruling that a
judicial decision that eliminates or substantially changes established property rights, which are a
legitimate expectation of the owner, is ‘arbitrary or irrational’ under the Due Process Clause.”
(emphasis added) (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005))) .
97. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
98. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 19 (1842) (“And we have not now the slightest difficulty
in holding, that [the Rules of Decision Act], upon its true intendment and construction, is
strictly limited to local statutes and local usages of the character before stated, and does not
extend to contracts and other instruments of a commercial nature, the true interpretation and
effect whereof are to be sought, not in the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the general
principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence.”).
99. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79.
100. Some scholars have suggested that Erie was concerned with curbing undue policy
making by the federal courts. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
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Renourishment and White, in contrast, is that judicial decisions are
vehicles designed to accomplish political purpose. White explicitly
holds that judges may campaign to further political agendas.
Subjecting judicial property-law decisions to a takings analysis, as in
Stop the Beach Renourishment, implies that those property-law
decisions are predicated upon the rendering court’s desire to pursue a
certain public policy course and not upon its dispassionate
interpretation of the law. Neither of these propositions can be
101
assigned to Erie.
It could also be argued that White and Stop the Beach
Renourishment are rooted in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
102
Defense Council, Inc. In Chevron, the Court held that courts must
defer to federal agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes and,
critically for our purposes, based this decision in part on the desire to
prevent judges from inserting their “personal policy preferences” into
103
statutory interpretation. But, while the clear implication of Chevron
is the unremarkable proposition that judges can insert their political
preferences into their decision, Chevron, unlike White, does not
104
suggest that they will inevitably do so. Indeed, by assigning to courts
the initial determination of whether a statute is ambiguous, Chevron
appears to presume that judges are fully able to avoid deciding at
105
least some issues by political preference. Nor does Chevron suggest,
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 815 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa, Customary International Law, and the
Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007). But see Craig Green, Repressing
Erie’s Myth, 96 CAL. L. REV. 595, 596–99 (2008) (refuting this contention).
101. In this respect it is notable that neither White nor Stop the Beach Renourishment cites
the Erie decision. For the argument that Erie does lead to the recognition of the doctrine of
judicial takings see W. David Sarratt, Note, Judicial Takings and the Course Pursued, 90 VA. L.
REV. 1487, 1531 (2004).
102. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
103. Id. at 865.
104. Nonetheless, there is significant literature arguing that despite Chevron’s stated goal of
avoiding judicial policy-making, the two-step framework has actually increased the effect of a
judge’s policy preferences. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make
Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825–26
(2006); Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 68–83 (1994); William S. Jordan, III, Deference Revisited: Politics as a
Determinant of Deference Doctrine and the End of the Apparent Chevron Consensus, 68 NEB. L.
REV. 454, 486–90 (1989); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and
Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1068–72
(1995). But see Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron
Doctrine in the U.S. Court of Appeals, 15 YALE J. REG. 1, 48 (1998) (arguing that the effect of
personal policy preferences on judicial decision-making is no more pronounced under Chevron
than under pre-Chevron understandings).
105. The Chevron analysis proceeds in two steps. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. The first
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like Stop the Beach Renourishment, that it is permissible for courts to
make pure policy. Rather, Chevron is a case designed to limit the
106
exercise of judicial policy-making, not license it.
So why, to repeat the question, would the Justices who joined
White and Justice Scalia’s opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment
go beyond precedent and choose to frame the issues before them in a
way that diminishes the role of law as a guiding force in judicial
decision-making? It is one thing, after all, for those on the outside to
contend that judges are essentially only political actors; it is another
when that message comes from the United States Supreme Court
107
itself.
Two possible reasons emerge. First, the Justices may have thought
that the Judicial Political Realist account is accurate. As discussed
108
above, many social scientists accept this view and the proposition
109
enjoys substantial empirical support. The White and Stop the Beach
Renourishment opinions then might just be judicial attempts to
110
reconcile the legal system with the Judicial Political Realist account.
Ascribing the Judicial Political Realist mantle to the specific
Justices joining White and the Justice Scalia opinion in Stop the Beach
Renourishment, however, seems mistaken. As Judge Posner noted, the
theory that law binds judges “remains the judiciary’s ‘official’ theory
of judicial behavior” and it is one that has been “proclaimed most
111
emphatically by Justices of the Supreme Court.” There seems little

requires the Court to apply its interpretation of the federal statute if the statutory language is
clear. Id. at 842–43. The first part of Chevron assumes that judges can make legal decisions
without being influenced by personal preferences. Chevron’s required deference only applies in
the second step—when the statutory language is unclear and policy considerations serve as a tiebreaker between competing statutory interpretations. Id. at 843.
106. The argument that White and Stop the Beach Renourishment are also designed to check
against judicial overreaching will be discussed below. See infra notes 115–16 and accompanying
text.
107. See supra Part III.
108. See supra Parts I and II.
109. See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text.
110. A multitude of legal scholars have attempted such a reconciliation by advocating for
reform. See, e.g., John Ferejohn, The Law of Politics: Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, 65
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 66–67 (2002) (calling for the reform of confirmation rules to
lessen the effects of politics on the judiciary); David A Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate,
the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1494 (1992) (arguing that to
reduce the politics of judicial confirmations, the Senate should take a stronger role); Thomas J.
Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 784–
91 (2008) (proposing that all appellate panels should have at least one judge from each of the
two major political parties).
111. POSNER, supra note 1, at 41.
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reason to suspect that the Court’s most conservative Justices would
veer from this “official” account. Justice Scalia, moreover, who wrote
both White and Stop the Beach Renourishment, has been a tireless
critic of those judges whom he believes insert their political
112
preferences into law. He has also vigorously and continually
asserted that politics should not determine the results in cases and
113
does not determine results, at least when he is the decision maker.
The second, and more likely, explanation is that the decisions in
White and Stop the Beach Renourishment can be seen as part of the
efforts by the Court’s conservative wing to combat perceived judicial
overreaching by other judges. Viewed in this way, the message is clear.
If judges are acting politically, they should be held accountable
politically.
Without doubt, the Court’s decision in White and the recognition
of a doctrine of judicial takings in Stop the Beach Renourishment
directly promote judicial accountability. In White that accountability
114
takes place in the ballot box, as the sitting judges will have to
answer to the voters for their “political” decisions. In Stop the Beach
Renourishment the accountability takes place by forcing the state to
115
bear the costs of its courts’ political choices.
But if that is the strategy in White and Stop the Beach
Renourishment, it is risky business because the logic of those decisions
impugns all judicial decision-making, not just those decisions that
certain Justices on the Court perceive as overreaching. The premise
that judicial decisions inevitably reflect political bias does not allow
112. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Since the
Constitution of the United States says nothing about this subject, it is left to be resolved by
normal democratic means, including the democratic adoption of provisions in state
constitutions. This Court has no business imposing upon all Americans the resolution favored
by the elite class from which the Members of this institution are selected . . . .”).
113. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1186–87 (1989).
114. See Michael Richard Dimino, Sr., Counter-Majoritarian Power and Judges’ Political
Speech, 58 FLA. L. REV. 53, 55–56 (2008) (arguing that White was aimed at making the state
courts more responsive to popular input because the White majority was concerned that the
state courts had overused their independence to stray too far from majoritarian preferences).
115. Justice Scalia’s Stop the Beach Renourishment opinion was also clearly designed to
prevent state courts from doing an end run around the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas v.
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), a case in which the Court held that the
determination of whether a legislative action affecting property rights constituted a taking
depended upon the owners’ settled property expectations. Notably, the Court in Lucas explicitly
forewarned that it would police state-court common-law decisions to assure they did not alter
the background law to avoid a takings finding. Id. at 1032 n.18. Perhaps not surprisingly, Justice
Scalia also authored the Lucas decision.
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for exception and does not exclude Justices sitting on the United
States Supreme Court. If lower-court decisions are inevitably political,
the same must be said of the decisions of the Supreme Court—
including those Supreme Court decisions that characterize the lowercourt decisions as being improperly political. According to the Judicial
Political Realist account, Supreme Court decisions that react to the
perceived political overreaching of the lower courts are no more than
political judgments themselves.
Consider how this understanding might play out in a takings case.
Assume that a state supreme court rules that its decision adversely
affecting a plaintiff’s property rights is not a taking. Further assume
that the United States Supreme Court disagrees and would find the
state-court decision to be a taking. If all judicial decision-making is
politically based, the Supreme Court decision is on no firmer ground
than the state-court decision because both are based upon the
deciding judges’ political views. There is no obvious legal justification
as to why the United States Supreme Court should replace a state
court’s political determination of whether a particular action
constitutes a taking with a contrary political determination of its own.
The decisions of both courts, under this theory, are only political
actions.
It might, of course, be contended that a state-court common-law
decision is not functionally equivalent to a Supreme Court’s
constitutional decision because common law is based upon constantly
changing policy determinations while constitutional law is defined by
fixed principles. But this contention is descriptively inaccurate. Even
Justice Scalia acknowledges that the rules of constitutional law
116
change. Alternatively, it might be argued that a state court’s
common-law decision is not functionally equivalent to a Supreme
Court’s constitutional-law decision because the former is a policy
choice while the latter is an apolitical interpretation of law. But if, as
White seems to suggest, judicial decisions inevitably reflect judge’s
predispositions, no particular judicial decision can be characterized as
a purely legal interpretation.
Still another response might be to contend that, at least with
respect to the recognition of a judicial takings doctrine, the
characterization of either the state or Supreme Court opinion as

116. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 784; see also Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (acknowledging that the Court makes “new rules” of criminal procedure).
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political is beside the point. The focus, rather, is only whether the
117
state-court opinion upset settled expectations. Consider, however,
the implications of an approach to judicial decision-making that
suggests that any time a court upsets settled ownership expectations,
the court’s decision should be subject to a takings analysis. In Lucas v.
118
South Carolina Coastal Council, for example, the Court ruled that a
state law designed to prevent beach erosion created a taking when it
rendered a landowner’s property valueless. If the Court subsequently
overturned the Lucas decision would it, or the United States
government, have to compensate the owner because the Court
changed the law in a way that upset the landowner’s expectations? Or,
if the Court reversed the line of political patronage cases holding that
the First Amendment prevents public employers from hiring and
119
firing employees on account of party affiliation, a change in law
120
would newly fired
specifically advocated by Justice Scalia,
employees be able to seek constitutional redress because the
Supreme Court upset settled expectations that they would be
121
protected from patronage decisions? The logic of Stop the Beach
Renourishment suggests that they should. The Justices who joined the
Stop the Beach Renourishment opinion, I suspect, would hold that
they should not.
This leads to the argument that the White and Stop the Beach
Renourishment Justices presumably really want to make—that their
decisions are based on the Rule of Law and are therefore valid
exercises of judicial power, while judicial decisions based on policy
preferences are illegitimate uses of judicial power. That criticism,
however, could be stated directly without adopting a jurisprudence
that treats judges as inherently political actors. Furthermore, it could
be stated more persuasively and without internal contradiction
because, whether or not they choose to admit it, the Justices’ Judicial
Political Realist approach undercuts the legitimacy of their own
decisions as much as it undercuts the legitimacy of the decisions they
condemn. There is, after all, an inherent paradox in the Court’s

117. Notably, this is how Justice Scalia framed the issue of how a taking should be
determined in his Lucas opinion. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–32 .
118. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
119. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S.
62 (1990).
120. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
121. Cf. Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (arguing that
entitlements should be considered property).
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adoption of the Judicial Political Realist account in that it makes the
Court’s adoption of that model itself subject to its own critique—that
its decision to do so is based on politics and not law.
No doubt there are political abuses in the use of judicial power
that can and should be curbed, but using Judicial Political Realism to
attack those excesses falls under its own weight. Further, as discussed
in the next section, it also causes more harm to judicial institutions
than it potentially cures.
V. THE DIMINISHMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW INHERENT IN THE
JUDICIAL POLITICAL REALIST ACCOUNT
That both White and Stop the Beach Renourishment appear to
accept the Judicial Political Realist account of judges as political
actors does not mean that the decision to do so is wrong. Social
scientists, after all, have supported the Judicial Political Realist
122
account with empirical evidence, and the rationales offered in White
and Stop the Beach Renourishment present at least plausible accounts
of judicial behavior. At the same time, however, the view that judges
are political actors is not indisputably correct. There are many
scholars, including leading judges, who vehemently contend that rules
123
and that
of law serve to constrain judicial decision-making
responsible judges successfully separate their political views from
124
their judicial decisions.
Nonetheless, even if the evidence is mixed, the choice between the
two models of judicial decision-making should not be random
selection, at least for a court. As the following subsections
demonstrate, there are serious institutional costs imposed upon the
judiciary by the vision of the judge as political actor that a court, if not
a social scientist, should find especially hard to ignore.
A. The Judicial Political Realist Account Suggests Judicial Review Is
Inconsistent with Democratic Principles
The first major concern inherent in the view of the judge as
political actor is that it suggests that the power of judicial review is

122. See POSNER, supra note 1.
123. See, e.g., Hon. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies
That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895,
1953 (2009).
124. See Solum, Judicial Selection: Ideology Versus Character, supra note 8.
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inconsistent with democratic principles. The power of courts to strike
down popularly enacted legislation (the power of judicial review) is
premised on the notion that the courts are interpreting the law, not
that they are pursuing their own political agendas. As Chief Justice
125
John Marshall famously stated in Marbury v. Madison, “it is
emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say
126
what the law is.” If judicial decisions are based on politics and not
law, however, the underlying rationale for granting courts the power
of judicial review evaporates. Instead, the power simply becomes the
power of one political body (the judiciary) to override the decisions
of another.
Seen in this light, there is no apparent reason to allow the courts
to have the last word. Rather, democratic principles cut in exactly the
opposite direction. The legislative and executive branches are
politically accountable to the voters, while the judiciary is not. As
such, democratic theory suggests that the decisions of the politically
127
accountable branches should prevail.
Creative arguments have been advanced to the contrary. Professor
Eric Posner, for example, contends that even if judicial decisions are
based at least in part on the political bias of the rendering court,
allowing judicial decisions to trump those of the politically
accountable branches still serves the important purpose of providing
128
another check on political action. To Posner, judicial review is just
another of the many obstacles to legislative enactment provided by
the Constitution and the legislative process. But unlike the barriers to
129
130
enacting legislation created by bicameralism, presentment, and
131
the various other veto points in the legislative process, judicial

125. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
126. Id. at 177.
127. See, e.g., James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 134–35 (1893); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (2004).
128. See POSNER, supra note 42, at 855 (“[J]udicial bias (within limits) does not matter at all
and could even be beneficial in a system, such as ours, where judges are expected to block or
restrict government actions, including statutes and regulations, that are themselves likely to
reflect ‘bias.’”).
129. U.S. CONST. art I, § 1.
130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2–3.
131. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT,
LEGISLATION 66 (2007) (noting the various “choke points” in the legislative process, such as
legislative committee review, legislative amendment, the filibuster, etc., that can kill a bill before
it has a chance to achieve final passage); see also Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, & Barry
Weingast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57
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review ends the debate without the possibility of political
compromise. It is therefore far more definitive in defeating the
popular will than are the other countermajoritarian structures.
Furthermore, because the Court, unlike the other branches, does not
respond to the voters, the institution with the final say on the legality
of political action is the institution that is the most insulated from the
democratic process. This raises not only democratic-process concerns,
but also the question of whether such an insulated body is informed
enough to make the difficult political and policy determinations that
132
come before it.
From a democratic-process perspective, then, an unelected
judiciary having the power of judicial review is inevitably
133
problematic. This power can be justified when the Court’s decisions
are based on the Rule of Law, but there is little or no reason to
authorize such power when the Court’s actions are based on a vision
134
of judicial review as no more than political second-guessing.
B. The Judicial Political Realist Account Undermines the Court’s
Perceived Legitimacy
The Judicial Political Realist account also undercuts the courts’
perceived legitimacy. As the plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood
135
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey explained:
[T]he Court cannot buy support for its decisions by spending
money and, except to a minor degree, it cannot independently
coerce obedience to its decrees. The Court’s power lies, rather, in
its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows
itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine
136
what the Nation’s law means and to declare what it demands.
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1994) (referring to the various veto points that occur along the
legislative process).
132. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L.
REV. 253, 254–55 (2009).
133. Alexander Bickel, in his seminal book, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986), coined the phrase
“countermajoritarian difficulty” to refer to the inherent tension between judicial review and the
democratic process. See also, Dinh, supra note 19, at 931–32; Dimino, supra note 114, at 61.
134. See Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. N.R.D.C., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (“[F]ederal judges—
who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who
do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the
struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones.”).
135. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
136. Id. at 865. The issue before the Court in Casey was whether Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), should be overturned. As the above-cited passage indicates, preserving the Court’s
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Based as it is on popular perception, however, judicial legitimacy
is inevitably strained by courts’ obligation to review the
constitutionality of popularly enacted measures. When courts use
their power to strike down measures in areas that excite the public’s
interest, such as school prayer, abortion, and flag burning, among
others, the courts’ actions can and do generate significant hostile
public response. And there lies the problem. The courts’ duty to strike
down popularly enacted measures places the source of the Court’s
137
legitimacy—public acceptance—under constant threat. The judiciary
must rely “on public sentiment to enable it to oppose public
138
sentiment,” and it must do so in an environment where it is
continually testing the limits of public support.
To be sure, the meaning of judicial legitimacy is itself subject to a
139
number of interpretations and is not always defined as strict
140
adherence to an objective rule of law. But there is one constant
theme: legitimacy depends on the courts’ decisions being seen as
based on a greater principle than simply the judiciary’s imposition of
141
its own political agenda. As Professor John Yoo writes, “only by
acting in a manner that suggests that its decisions are the product of
142
law rather than politics can the Court maintain its legitimacy.” There
is no reason, after all, for people to accept judicial decisions that
invalidate popular measures if those decisions are nothing more than
the judiciary’s trumping of popular political preferences with political
143
preferences of their own. Characterizing judicial decisions as
legitimacy was the guiding reason that Roe was not overruled. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 845–46.
137. See Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596,
2610–11 (2003) (referring to historical attacks on the judiciary for providing decisions that
opposed public opinion).
138. Dimino, supra note 114, at 59.
139. See Richard Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2005).
Indeed the question of how the Court can best maintain its legitimacy has engaged some of our
most prominent legal academic minds for decades. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 133; Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); Paul
Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality
of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 929, 930 (1983).
140. It has been argued, for example, that in order to be legitimate, a judicial decision must
also comport with morality. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law
Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 747 (1991).
141. See Dinh, supra note 19, at 931–32; Wechsler, supra note 139, at 10–20.
142. John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 781–82
(2001).
143. There is little to suggest, for example, that a judge’s political decisions are likely to be
superior to those of other political actors. The best argument, in that respect, is that the fact that
judges are more insulated from the political fray than are “other” political actors means that
their political judgments are likely to be less influenced by short-term considerations. But while
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political thus cuts at the very heart of the reason why the public
should perceive those decisions as legitimate.
C. The Judicial Political Realist Account Undercuts the Constitutional
System of Checks and Balances
The Judicial Political Realist account also subverts any reason the
other branches should defer to the judiciary when their own power is
144
challenged. Consider United States v. Nixon, in which the Court,
over a claim of executive privilege, ordered the President to turn over
145
tapes to a special prosecutor, or Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, in which the
Court held that a United States citizen held as an enemy combatant
must be allowed an opportunity to contest his enemy-combatant
designation. In both cases, the President had strong institutional
reasons to oppose the Court’s decisions and yet in both cases the
President acceded to the Court’s authority.
Why, though, should an elected President defer to an unelected
judiciary if the latter’s decision is based on no more than political or
policy judgment? Had the President been able to characterize the
Court’s action as merely “political” and not based on the Rule of Law,
he would have a powerful argument for potential disobedience. He
could assert in Nixon, for example, that he need not turn over the
tapes because the executive branch has the political authority to
decide what matters are protected by executive privilege and the
political views of the Court on privilege issues should be discounted.
In Hamdi, he could claim that a decision not to comply with the
Court’s order could be justified because, as President, he has a far
greater understanding of why complying with the order might prevent
him from fulfilling his constitutional duties than does the Court. Thus,
the President could argue, with considerable political resonance, that
he is entitled to reject the Court’s decision because he is in a far
better position than the Court to weigh the national security interests
at stake in detaining suspected enemy combatants, and that
compliance with the Court’s relatively uninformed “political” decision
insulation from political pressures may lead to better results in some circumstances, it may lead
to unrealistic decisions in others. Furthermore, even if insulation from political pressures
provides some decisional benefits, those benefits may not outweigh the fact that a judge, whose
primary training is legal, does not have the particularized training necessary to reach the best
results on policy issues dealing with such matters as the environment, national security, and
even campaign finance.
144. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715–16 (1974).
145. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004).

DO NOT DELETE

2011]

6/23/2011 4:24:45 PM

JUDICIAL TAKINGS AND THE JUDGE AS A POLITICAL ACTOR

33

could place American lives at risk. A President taking such actions in
today’s political climate would, of course, face enormous fallout, but if
the perception is that the Court is only a political actor, a President
might be able to pursue such courses with very little political cost. It is
only because the Court’s decisions are imbued with an authority
derived from the Rule of Law that those decisions demand respect
from the other branches. Recharacterizing the Court’s decisions as
merely political takes away much of the President’s (and Congress’s)
motivation to comply and thereby threatens the constitutional system
146
of checks and balances.
D. The Judicial Political Realist Account Fosters Judicial Political
Activism
At this point, those who believe that political decision-making by
judges is a serious concern might respond that the “harms” to judicial
institutions noted above are all to the good. If judges are essentially
political actors, democratic values are threatened, judicial decisions
should not be perceived as legitimate, and judicial orders need not
merit obedience from the other branches. If the Judicial Political
Realist account is accurate, in short, the true nature of judicial
behavior should be exposed.
Ironically, however, the Judicial Political Realist critique and its
apparent adoption in White and Stop the Beach Renourishment may
actually serve to increase judicial political activism, not curtail it. First,
doctrinal acceptance of the model of the judge as political actor
eliminates one of the best guards against judicial overreaching—
public criticism of the judge as acting outside her appropriate judicial
role. In the present climate, as Professor Viet Dinh explains, public
accusations of judicial activism have a negative connotation, the
stigma of which serves as a check on the otherwise unaccountable
147
branch. For this reason, criticizing judges for judicial activism serves
to confine judicial excess by “reminding judges to perform their
proper function as members of the judicial branch—interpreters of
148
the Constitution.” But there is little corrective effect to be had in
146. See Martin H. Redish, Legal Realism and the Confirmation Process: A Comment on
Professor Nagel’s Thesis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 886, 887 (1990); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability
and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 426–27 (1996)
(noting that the Court’s power to check the other branches depended upon it exercising judicial
authority to expound upon existing law and not to create new law).
147. Dinh, supra note 19, at 939–40.
148. Id. at 940.
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accusing a judge of having decided a case based upon her political
motivations if the Supreme Court itself has concluded that political
decision-making by courts is both acceptable and inevitable. The
Court’s acceptance of the Judicial Political Realist account, then,
counteracts a key incentive for judicial restraint.
Second, and perhaps even more significantly, the Judicial Political
Realist critique may actually encourage judges to rule based on their
political beliefs. If political preferences are expected to influence
judicial decision-making, there is no reason for a judge to try and
minimize the role they play in her decisional process. That is, if a judge
is already presumed to decide cases based on her political preferences,
she may as well decide cases based on her political preferences. As
Justice Kennedy argued in his Stop the Beach Renourishment
concurrence, telling courts they have the power to make pure policy
149
decisions may actually encourage them to do so.
Conversely, maintaining the expectation that judges should not act
politically can serve to limit the role politics plays in judicial decisionmaking. A judge faced with the professional norm that she should not
decide cases based upon her policy preferences is likely to decide
cases differently than if her expected behavior is to insert her political
150
beliefs into her judicial function. Thus, even if the Judicial Political
Realist critique is accurate in its account that political views influence
judicial decision-making, the extent that a judge will consciously
attempt to minimize the role political preferences play in her decision
making will depend significantly upon the expectations placed upon
151
her behavior. White and Stop the Beach Renourishment, however,
149. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2616
(2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
150. See Redish, supra note 146, at 887; see generally Solum, The Virtues and Vices of
Judging, supra note 8 (illustrating the importance of legal analysis in appellate judging, and how
this differs from the idea of a purely political judiciary).
151. Sociologists have studied expectation effects in other fields, particularly in education
and management. See, e.g., Nicole M. Kierein & Michael A. Gold, Pygmalion in Work
Organizations: A Meta-Analysis, 21 J. ORG. BEHAV. 913 (2000); Dov Eden, Leadership and
Expectations: Pygmalion Effects and Other Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in Organizations, 3
LEADERSHIP Q. 271 (1992). “The Pygmalion Effect,” first articulated by Robert Rosenthal and
Lenore Jacobsen, PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM: TEACHER EXPECTATIONS AND PUPILS’
INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT (1968), is the notion that placing greater expectations on
people improves their subsequent performance. See also Robert P. Mosteller, Failures of the
American Adversarial System to Protect the Innocent and Conceptual Advantages in the
Inquisitorial Design for Investigative Fairness, 36 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. LIT. (forthcoming
2011) (citing Barbara O’Brien, A Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the Interplay Between
Institutional Incentives and Bounded Rationality in Prosecutorial Decision Making, 74 MO. L.
REV. 999 (2009) (demonstrating the effect professional expectations play in influencing
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place expectations decidedly on the side of judges issuing politically
influenced rulings. They are more problem than solution.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Judicial Political Realist inquiry provides an invaluable lens
into judicial behavior. It may even serve to improve judicial decisionmaking by making judges aware of predispositions that might
unintentionally affect their decisional processes. On the other hand,
incorporating the idea that judges are inherently political actors into
constitutional jurisprudence damages judicial authority and
legitimacy. The Justices in White and Stop the Beach Renourishment
who implicitly adopted this view were no doubt concerned with
curbing what they saw as improper political decision-making by some
judges. The method they chose, however, does not curb judicial
abuse—it encourages it. It does not serve the Rule of Law—it
diminishes its authority.

prosecutorial judgment)).

